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ADLOO v. H.T. BROWN REAL ESTATE, INC.: "CAVEAT
EXCULPATOR"-AN EXCULPATORY CLAUSE MAY NOT
BE EFFECTIVE UNDER MARYLAND'S HEIGHTENED
LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
I. INTRODUCTION
The freedom to contract is a well-founded theory based on
principles of public policy.' Consistent with this theory, exculpatory
contract clauses are generally valid.' An exculpatory contract clause
is "an agreement to release one or more individuals or entities from
liability resulting from any negligent act or omission or other
wrongful conduct committed by" any person or entity-it excul-
pates a party from liability.3 However, only a carefully crafted excul-
1. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40, 70
(1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107
(1970); Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldgs., Inc., 155 N.E.2d 372,
379-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958); Rogers v. Webb, 558 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Iowa 1997);
Anne Arundel County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 329 Md. 677, 686,
621 A.2d 427, 431 (1993); Leet v. Totah, 329 Md. 645, 662, 620 A.2d 1372, 1380
(1993); Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 326, 41 A.2d 66, 70 (1945); Progressive
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Jester, 683 P.2d 180, 182 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
2. See Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 531, 644 A.2d 522, 525 (1994) (citing Winter-
stein v. Wilcom, 16. Md. App. 130, 293 A.2d 821 (1972)); Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 350, 587 A.2d 511, 518 (1991); Sullivan v.
Mosner, 266 Md. 479, 494-96, 295 A.2d 482, 490-91 (1972); Eastern Ave. Corp.
v. Hughes, 228 Md. 477, 480, 180 A.2d 486, 488 (1962); Baker v. Roy H. Haas
Assoc., 97 Md. App. 371, 377, 629 A.2d 1317, 1320 (1993); Schrier v. Beltway
Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 288, 533 A.2d 1316, 1319 (1987); Boucher v.
Riner, 68 Md. App. 539, 548, 514 A.2d 485, 490 (1986); see also, e.g., Nikolic v.
Seidenberg, 610 N.E.2d 177, 179-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (explaining that al-
though exculpatory clauses are not favored and are strictly construed, they will
be enforced unless they are against public policy); 57A AM. JuR_ 2D Negligence
§ 53 (1989) (explaining that the generally accepted rule is to permit exculpa-
tory contract clauses for negligent acts because public policy favors the free-
dom to contract); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 68, at 482 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that public policy does not nor-
mally prevent the parties from contracting as they see fit); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CoNTRAcTS § 195 cmt. a (1981) (explaining that parties to a contract
can ordinarily absolve themselves from liability for harm caused by their own
negligence).
3. Cadek v. Great Lakes Dragaway, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 420, 422 (N.D. Ill. 1994); see
also Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assoc., 44 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 1995) (illustrating
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patory clause can insulate a party from liability for their own
negligence.
Maryland courts recognize that exculpatory clauses are valid
and enforceable when the language used ostensibly expresses the
intent to exculpate one of the parties from liability.4 In Adloo v. H.T
Brown Real Estate, Inc.,5 the court of appeals addressed what is re-
quired to create a sufficient exculpatory contract clause in a real es-
tate listing agreement. 6 The court held that the language used in
two separate contracts was insufficient to exculpate a real estate
agency from liability stemming from its own negligence.
7
The Adloo court's holding will certainly guide real estate bro-
kers when crafting future listing agreements with homeowners. Of
more notable significance, however, is the effect Adloo will have on
the language employed in all future exculpatory clauses executed in
Maryland.8 Indeed, the opinion in Adloo may invalidate many ex-
isting exculpatory clauses. Therefore, drafters must review and con-
ceivably redraft9 current exculpatory clauses to ensure that the
clause effectively exonerates a party from liability.
This Note examines the court of appeals's decision in Adloo.
Part II traces the development and validity of exculpatory clauses,
with an emphasis on Maryland law.10 Part III discusses the facts in
Adloo and the court's rationale." Part IV analyzes the Adloo opinion,
concluding that the standard adopted is too amorphous and leaves
practitioners without intelligible guidance.' 2 Finally, Part IV also dis-
cusses the impact of the Adloo opinion and provides contract draft-
ers with suggestions for complying with the new standard adopted
by the Adloo court.
13
the impact of an exculpatory clause); Crawford v. Buckner, 839 S.W.2d 754,
756 (Tenn. 1992) (describing the rationale supporting the enforceability of an
exculpatory clause); Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 657-59 (Wis. 1991)
(defining an exculpatory provision in a contract).
4. See Wolf 335 Md. at 537, 644 A.2d at 528.
5. 344 Md. 254, 686 A.2d 298 (1996).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 84-137.
7. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 267-68, 686 A.2d at 305.
8. See infra notes 212-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of instances
where exculpatory provisions are commonly found.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 232-56 for a discussion of suggestions for
drafting after the Adloo decision.
10. See infra notes 14-83 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 84-132 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 133-211 and accompanying text.
13. See infta notes 212-56 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. General Validity
Due to strong public policy considerations that support parties'
freedom to contract, 4 courts consistently recognize that individuals
should be permitted to draft legally enforceable agreements without
judicial intervention.'" Although contracts that immunize parties
from their own negligence are not viewed favorably, 16 the Maryland
judiciary generally upholds these types of agreements."
Eastern Avenue Corp. v. Hughes18 exhibits Maryland judiciary's
tendency to uphold exculpatory contract clauses in Maryland. In
Eastern, the court of appeals examined a lease clause that attempted
to exonerate a landlord from liability for injury to the person or
property of a tenant.19 The court upheld the validity of the clause.20
Shortly thereafter, the General Assembly of Maryland responded to
this judicial act by abrogating the court's holding. 21 The General As-
14. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
15. See United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457, 462 (1950) (explaining that courts
are reluctant to nullify the intent of a competent party; if anticipatory provi-
sions for the settlement of disputes are to be deprived, they should be de-
prived by the legislative branch).
16. See, e.g., Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390, 402 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (explain-
ing that "clauses which exonerate a party from the consequences of his own
negligence are looked upon with disfavor").
17. See Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 531, 644 A.2d 522, 525 (1994) (citing Winter-
stein v. Wilcom, 16 Md. App. 130, 135, 293 A.2d 821, 824 (1972)); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 350, 587 A.2d 511, 518 (1991);
Sullivan v. Mosner, 266 Md. 479, 494-96, 295 A.2d 482, 490-91 (1972); Eastern
Ave. Corp. v. Hughes, 228 Md. 477, 480, 180 A.2d 486, 488 (1962); Baker v.
Roy H. Haas Assoc., 97 Md. App. 371, 377, 629 A.2d 1317, 1320 (1993); Schrier
v. Beltway Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 293-94, 533 A.2d 1316, 1322 (1987);
Boucher v. Riner, 68 Md. App. 539, 548, 514 A.2d 485, 490 (1986).
18. 228 Md. 477, 180 A.2d 486 (1962).
19. See id. at 479, 180 A.2d at 488. The clause provided:
The Tenant covenants and agrees that the Landlord shall not be lia-
ble for any injury to his person or damages to his property occa-
sioned by failure to keep the demised premises in repair or howso-
ever caused, nor shall the Landlord be responsible for any accident
to the Tenant or any occupant or visitor to the premises resulting
from any cause whatsoever; and Tenant agrees he will not hold Land-
lord responsible in any way, whether such accident occurred in any
of the Landlord's buildings or on any of its property.
Id.
20. See id. at 480, 180 A.2d at 488.
21. See 1964 Md. Laws ch. 124 (recodified at MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-105
19981
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sembly enacted a statute that invalidated agreements between land-
lords and tenants that exculpate landlords from liability for their
own negligence.2 2 Apart from landlord and tenant law, however, the
General Assembly has not abrogated the common law on exculpatory
clauses.
23
The policies behind the freedom to contract support the judici-
ary's general position of upholding exculpatory clauses. As one no-
table scholar explained: "It is quite possible for the parties expressly
to agree, in advance, that the defendant is under no obligation of
care for the benefit of the plaintiff, and shall not be liable for the
consequences of conduct which would otherwise be negligent. ''24
The law, however, seeks to discourage negligent conduct by impos-
ing liability on culpable parties. In balancing these competing inter-
ests, courts recognize exculpatory contract clauses as valid and en-
forceable, but stricdy interpret and construe any ambiguity against
the party relying on them.
25
B. Three Exceptional Circumstances to the General Validity
Courts will disregard otherwise valid exculpatory clauses under
(1988)).
22. See id.; Prince Phillip Partnership v. Cutlip, 321 Md. 296, 303, 582 A.2d 992,
995 (1990) (holding that a lease provision was void pursuant to a statute that
invalidated clauses which exculpate landlords from liability arising from the
landlord's negligence).
23. See Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 294, 533 A.2d 1316, 1322
(1987). However, the General Assembly has enacted analogous legislation for-
bidding indemnity provisions in construction and maintenance contracts that
were used to accomplish results similar to exculpatory clauses. See MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-305 (1989 & Supp. 1993). The statute provides:
A covenant, promise, agreement . ..relating to the construction, al-
teration, repair, or maintenance of a building, structure, appurte-
nance or appliance, . . .purporting to indemnify the promisee against li-
ability for damages ...resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee or
indemnity, his agents or employees, is against public policy and is
void and unenforceable.
Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the Adloo court applied the same rules of con-
struction employed by courts when interpreting indemnity clauses to the ex-
culpatory clause at issue explaining: "[w]e see no reason, when the effect of
the two clauses is the same to approach their interpretation from a different
analytical premise." Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 264
n.7, 686 A.2d 298, 303 n.7 (1996).
24. KEETON ET AL.,supra note 2, § 68, at 482.
25. See Hornbeck v. All Am. Indoor Sports, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).
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three exceptional circumstances. In Wolf v. Ford26 the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland focused on the enforceability of an exculpatory
contract clause in an agreement between an investor and a securi-
ties investment firm.27 The clause at issue relieved the investment
firm, Legg Mason, from liability for losses resulting from its negli-
gence.28 The court held that the exculpatory clause was valid; there-
fore, Legg Mason was exculpated from liability arising from a negli-
gent act by its broker.29 In formulating its opinion, the court of
appeals relied on the rationale in Winterstein v. Wilcom3°-a seminal
case on the modern law of exculpatory contracts decided by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
Citing Winterstein, the Wolf court reiterated the general rule
that, absent a law that prohibits the exculpatory clauses at issue,31
there are three exceptional circumstances when an exculpatory
clause may be invalidated and unenforceable: intentional harm or
extreme forms of negligence, unequal bargaining power, and those
adverse to the public interest.32
26. 335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522 (1994).
27. See id. at 527, 644 A.2d at 523. Wolf entered an investment agreement with a
broker at Legg Mason to earn money for college and preserve the bulk of her
investment. See id. at 528, 644 A.2d at 524. Throughout the year, Wolf with-
drew large sums of money which required the prompt sale of one or more of
the stocks from her portfolio. See id. at 529, 644 A.2d at 525. The prompt sale
caused losses for Wolf, and she filed suit. See id. at 530, 644 A.2d at 525.
28. See id. at 528, 644 A.2d at 524. The Agreement provided:
You are hereby authorized to buy, sell and generally trade in securi-
ties, on margin, in cash or otherwise in accordance with your terms
and conditions for my account and risk .... I hereby exonerate you
from any and all liability for losses which may occur while you are
acting on my behalf except for such as may result from your gross
negligence or wilful misconduct.
Id.
29. See id. at 527-28, 644 A.2d at 524.
30. 16 Md. App. 130, 293 A.2d 821 (1972).
31. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-105 (1988) (declaring exculpatory clauses
in real property leases to be void as against public policy); see also MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-305 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (providing that an indem-
nity provision in a contract for "the construction, alteration, repair, or mainte-
nance of a building, structure, appurtenance or appliance, including moving,
demolition and excavating connected with it ... is against public policy and is
void and unenforceable"); supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
32. See Wolf, 335 Md. at 531-32, 644 A.2d at 525-26 (citing Winterstein, 16 Md. App.
at 135-36, 293 A.2d at 824).
1998] 443
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1. Intentional Harm or Extreme Negligence
The first circumstance, intentional harm or extreme forms of
negligence, exists when a party to a contract attempts to avoid liabil-
ity for intentional conduct or harm caused by reckless, wanton, or
gross behavior.33 This rule finds its premise in the disdain for bad
faith in the performance of contractual duties.34 Indeed, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that bad faith subjects the actor to lia-
bility regardless of the language of an exculpatory provision. 35
2. Grossly Unequal Bargaining Power
The second circumstance occurs when the contract is the result
of grossly unequal bargaining power between the parties. 36 The Win-
terstein court explained that "[w] hen one party is at such an obvious
disadvantage in bargaining power that the effect of the contract is
to put him at the mercy of the other's negligence, the agreement is
void. ' 37 Agreements procured through unequal bargaining power vi-
olate public policy.3 Courts consider the surrounding circumstances
of the agreement in determining whether unequal bargaining
power existed at the time of the agreement's acceptance. 39 If the ex-
33. See id. at 531, 644 A.2d at 525.
34. See Dorothy C. Alevizatos, Contracts, Developments in Maryland Law, 1992-93, 53
MD. L. REv. 733, 742 (1994); see also Hupp v. George R. Rembold Bldg. Co.,
279 Md. 597, 603, 369 A.2d 1048, 1052 (1977) (explaining that bad faith may
be demonstrated by a refusal to perform when there is the ability to do so);
Charles County Broad. Co., Inc. v. Meares, 270 Md. 321, 333-34, 311 A.2d 27,
35 (1973) (holding that bad faith was evidenced by the failure to effectuate
the necessary FCC document).
35. See Sullivan v. Mosner, 266 Md. 479, 496, 295 A.2d 482, 491 (1972) (explaining
that an exculpatory provision does not protect a person from liability when a
breach is intentional or occurs as a result of bad faith or reckless indiffer-
ence).
36. See Wolf, 335 Md. at 531, 644 A.2d at 525-26.
37. Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 135-36, 293 A.2d at 824.
38. See id.
39. See Boucher v. Riner, 68 Md. App. 539, 550, 514 A.2d 485, 491 (1986). Com-
pulsion is one factor looked upon by courts as evidence of an unequal bar-
gaining position. See id. According to the Boucher court, "[a] n agreement will
be invalid if ... one party is at an obvious disadvantage in bargaining at the
time the contract is entered so that . . . [the party is] at the mercy of the
other's negligence." Id. at 548-49, 514 A.2d at 490; see also Flow Indus., Inc. v.
Fields Constr. Co., 683 F. Supp. 527, 531 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that there
was not unequal bargaining solely based upon the difference in sizes of two
companies); Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 297, 533 A.2d
1316, 1324 (1987) (concluding there was no unequal bargaining between a cli-
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culpatory clause was the product of unequal bargaining power be-
tween the parties, a court will not honor it.
40
3. The Public Interest Exception
Finally, an exculpatory clause may be held invalid and unen-
forceable when the clause adversely affects the public interest.41 The
public interest exception "includes the performance of a public ser-
vice obligation [such as] public utilities, common carriers, innkeep-
ers, and public warehousemen. '' 42 The public interest quandary also
encompasses "those transactions . . . that are so important to the
public good that an exculpatory clause would be 'patently offen-
sive,' such that 'the common sense of the community would pro-
nounce it' invalid."
43
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not specifically defined
this public interest exception, but rather has described it as a "shift-
ing and variable notion appealed to only when no other argument
is available, and which, if relied upon today, may be utterly repudi-
ated tomorrow."" The public interest exception is ambiguous and
obscure. Consequently, courts have been hesitant to invalidate
clauses on the sole premise that they adversely affect public
interest.
45
ent and a business where the business provided a non-essential service and
where alternatives were available).
40. See Boucher, 68 Md. App. at 550, 514 A.2d at 491.
41. See Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 532, 644 A.2d 522, 526 (1994).
42. Id.
43. Wolf, 335 Md. at 532, 644 A.2d at 526 (quoting Maryland Nat'l Cap. Park &
Planning Comm. v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 606, 386 A.2d 1216,
1228 (1978) (quoting Estate of Woods, Weeks & Co., 52 Md. 520, 536
(1879))).
44. Kenneweg v. County Comm'rs, 102 Md. 119, 125, 62 A. 249, 251 (1905).
45. See Maryland Nat'l Cap. & Planning, 282 Md. at 606, 386 A.2d at 1228.
Fearing the disruptive effect that invocation of the highly elusive
public policy principle would likely exert on the stability of commer-
cial and contractual relations, Maryland courts have been hesitant to
strike down voluntary bargains on public policy grounds, doing so
only in those cases where the challenged agreement is patently offen-
sive to the public good, that is, where "the common sense of the en-
tire community would . . . pronounce it" invalid.
Id. (quoting Estate of Woods, Weeks & Co., 52 Md. 520, 536 (1879)); see also
Trupp v. Wolff, 24 Md. App. 588, 616, 335 A.2d 171, 188 (1975) (illustrating




In Winterstein, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland deter-
mined the validity of an exculpatory clause that released the owner
of a speed raceway from negligence liability 6 In determining
whether providing speed raceway accommodations to the public was
an act affecting the public interest, the court of special appeals
cited the six-factor test set forth in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of
California.4 The six-factor test, explained in Part IV of this Note, 48
provides a framework for analyzing transactions that affect the pub-
lic interest.
The Winterstein court noted that the Tunkl test should only be
used as a "rough oudine of that type of transaction in which excul-
patory provisions will be held invalid. '49 In Wolf, the court of ap-
peals expressly declined to adopt the Tunkl test as a conclusive
method to determine what acts affect the public interest.50 The
court of appeals agreed that the Tunkl factors should be considered,
but that "[t]he ultimate determination of what constitutes the pub-
lic interest must be made considering the totality of the circum-




Before considering the three exceptional circumstances when
otherwise valid exculpatory clauses are ineffective,5 2 the Adloo court
framed a threshold inquiry-whether a valid exculpatory clause ex-
isted, from a contractual standpoint.5 3 In other words, the court
considered whether the exculpatory provisions were sufficiently
46. See Winterstein v. Wilcom, 16 Md. App. 130, 131-32, 293 A.2d 821, 822 (1972).
Winterstein was timing an acceleration run of his car when he hit a cylinder
head left on the track by Wilcom's employees. See id. at 133, 293 A.2d at 823.
Winterstein lost control of his car and sustained serious, painful, and perma-
nent injuries. See id.
47. 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 193-97 for a discussion of the six-factor
public interest analysis test set forth by TunkL
49. Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 136-37, 293 A.2d at 825; see also Baker v. Roy H.
Haas Assoc., 97 Md. App. 371, 380, 629 A.2d 1317, 1322 (1993) (identifying
the six-factor test as a rough outline).
50. See Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 535, 644 A.2d 522, 527 (1994).
51. Id.
52. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three ex-
ceptions presented in Winterstein.
53. See Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 261, 686 A.2d 298, 301
(1996).
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drafted to insulate the broker from liability for its own negligence.1
4
Whether a clause is sufficient to shield a party from liability de-
pends on the intent of the parties. 5
When courts construe contractual terms, their role is to "ascer-
tain and effectuate the intention of the parties, as [it] appears from
the whole agreement. ' 56 In determining the intent of the parties,
the contract must be viewed in light of the circumstances under
which it was entered.5 7 As with the rules of statutory construction,
the intent of the parties to a contract is derived from the language
of the contract itself.
5 8
Exculpatory clauses are contractual agreements. Thus, Mary-
land contract law will govern how a court interprets and construes
exculpatory clauses. It is well established that Maryland courts apply
an objective standard when interpreting and construing contracts.
59
When objectively interpreting exculpatory clauses, "[i]t is the de-
gree of clarity that the language must convey in order to achieve a
particular legal result which is the crucial question."6°
In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels,61 the court of ap-
peals explained that when a contract's language is expressed in
clear and unambiguous terms, the court will not engage in con-
struction, but will look solely to what was written as conclusive of
the parties' intent.62 The court set forth the standard as follows:
A court construing an agreement under this test must first
determine from the language of the agreement itself what a
reasonable person in the position of the parties would have
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Highley v. Phillips, 176 Md. 463, 471, 5 A.2d 824, 828 (1939). In Highley, an ac-
tion was brought to recover the value of sand which was allegedly not in-
cluded in the contract for the sale of dirt. See id. at 466-67, 5 A.2d at 826-27.
The Highley court was faced with interpreting the term "dirt" in the sales con-
tract between a landowner and a contractor. See id. at 466, 5 A.2d at 826. Id. at
471, 5 A.2d at 828.
57. See, e.g., id. at 463, 5 A.2d at 824; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Mattingly Lumber
Co., 176 Md. 217, 222, 4 A.2d 447, 450 (1939); Rollins v. Bravos, 80 Md. App.
617, 626, 565 A.2d 382, 386 (1989).
58. See, e.g., Adloo, 344 Md. at 261, 686 A.2d at 301.
59. See, e.g., GMAC v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 293 Md. 409, 420, 445 A.2d 14, 19
(1982).
60. Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143, 145 (Vt. 1988).
61. 303 Md. 254, 492 A.2d 1306 (1985).
62. See id. at 261, 492 A.2d at 1310.
1998]
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meant at the time it was effectuated. In addition, when the
language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is
no room for construction, and a court must presume that
the parties meant what they expressed.63
When there is no ambiguity, the appropriate test of a contract's
meaning is what a reasonable person would interpret the contract
to mean rather than what the parties to the contract actually in-
tended it to mean.64 Thus, when a contract is drafted with clear and
unambiguous language, the language will not yield "to what the
parties thought that the agreement meant or intended it to
mean."
65
If a contract is unambiguous, parol evidence 66 is inadmissible
"to show the intention of the parties or to vary, alter, or contradict
the terms of that contract,"67 provided that there is no evidence of
fraud, duress, or mistake. 68 Conversely, when the language of a con-
tract is unclear, relevant parol evidence may be introduced to ex-
plain the parties' intentions. 69 If the parol evidence fails to resolve
the ambiguity, the clause will be strictly construed against its author.
D. Pivotal Cases
The Court of Appeals of Maryland construed the meaning of
an exculpatory clause in Home Indemnity Co. v. Basiliko.70 The issue
was whether a clause in a lease absolved the lessors from liability for
property damage caused by a leaking air conditioner.71 The clause
at issue provided:
Landlord shall not be responsible for loss of or damage to
property of Tenant in said building caused by fire or other
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. Id.; see Board of Trustees v. Sherman, 280 Md. 373, 380, 373 A.2d 626, 629
(1977).
66. Parol evidence is "[o]ral or verbal evidence ... and with reference to con-
tracts . . . is the same as extraneous evidence or evidence aliunde." BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 1117 (6th ed. 1990).
67. GMAC, 303 Md. at 261-62, 492 A.2d at 1310.
68. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Marks Rentals, Inc., 288 Md. 428, 433, 418 A.2d 1187,
1190 (1980); Equitable Trust Co. v. Imbesi, 287 Md. 249, 271-72, 412 A.2d 96,
107 (1980); Glass v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 213 Md. 44, 57-58, 131 A.2d 254, 261
(1957); Markoff v. Kreiner, 180 Md. 150, 155, 23 A.2d 19, 23 (1941).
69. See Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 177, 399 A.2d 1374, 1378 (1979).
70. 245 Md. 412, 226 A.2d 258 (1967).
71. See id. at 416, 226 A.2d at 260.
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casualty, or by any acts of negligence of co-tenants or other
occupants of said building or any other person, or by rain
or snow or water or steam that may leak into or flow from
said building through any defects in the roof or plumbing
or from any other source.
72
The court held that the language used in the exculpatory
clause was unambiguous. 73 The court noted that although "the
clause was not skillfully drawn, '7 4 the water emitted from the air
conditioning unit reasonably fell under the "any other source"
5
provision.76 The court explained that "it is clear, since the meaning
of the words in the third category of causes is neither doubtful nor
susceptible of more than one construction, that the lessors were not
responsible for the damage suffered by the lessees.
77
In Crockett v. Crothers,78 the court was petitioned to interpret an
indemnification clause. 79 The issue was whether a contractor that
agreed to an indemnification clause ° was obligated to indemnify an
engineer against the engineer's own negligence.8' In interpreting
the clause, the court noted the general rule that "contracts will not
be construed to indemnify a person against his own negligence un-
less an intention to do so is expressed in those very words or in
other unequivocal terms."
82
72. Id. at 414-15, 226 A.2d at 259.
73. See id. at 417, 226 A.2d at 260.
74. Id.
75. See supra text accompanying note 72.
76. See Home Indem. Co., 245 Md. at 417, 226 A.2d at 261.
77. Id. at 417, 226 A.2d at 260-61.
78. 264 Md. 222, 285 A.2d 612 (1972).
79. See id.
80. While an exculpatory clause insulates a party from liability, an indemnification
clause merely shifts liability to another party-the indemnitor. See Valhal
Corp. v. Sullivan Assoc., 44 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 1995). "The difference be-
tween the two clauses 'is .. .a real one.' " Id. (citing Posttape Assocs. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 755 (3d Cir. 1976)).
81. See Crockett, 264 Md. at 223, 285 A.2d at 613 (examining the liability of a build-
ing contractor who damaged a water line while performing pursuant to speci-
fications prepared by an engineer who negligently omitted the pipe from the
plans).
82. Id. at 227, 285 A.2d at 615 (citing Blockston v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 576,
591 (D. Md. 1968); Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Devlin, 211 Md. 404, 421-22, 127 A.2d
640, 648-49 (1956); Sheila K. Sachs, Interpretation of Indemnity Clauses in Con-
struction Contracts-Macon v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 24 MD. L. REv. 66
(1964)).
Baltimore Law Review
The court held that the clause did not satisfy this general
rule-the indemnification clause failed to unequivocally express that
the engineer was indemnified against his own negligence. 3 Analo-
gous to Crockett, the Adloo decision provided insight into how an ex-
culpatory clause can unequivocally express the intent to absolve a
party from their own negligence.
III. INSTANT CASE
A. Facts and Procedural History
Adloo v. H.T Brown Real Estate, Inc.,8 4 addressed the sufficiency
of the language required to create an operative exculpatory clause
in Maryland.8 5 As previously discussed, broad language used in a re-
lease may not always be sufficient to exculpate a party from liabil-
ity.86 In Adloo, a homeowner directly challenged the exculpatory
clauses contained in two standard real estate contracts. 7
Abdolrahman and Monireh Adloo signed two separate con-
tracts with H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc. ("H.T. Brown"), a real es-
tate listing contract and lock-box88 agreement.8 9 The exculpatory
clauses in each of these contracts formed the basis of the dispute
between the parties.90
This listing contract appointed H.T. -Brown as the exclusive sell-
ing agent of the Adloo's home.91 Within the listing contract, there
was an exculpatory clause that attempted to release H.T. Brown
from any future loss of property.92 The listing contract contained
the following clause:
83. See id. at 228, 285 A.2d at 615.
84. 344 Md. 254, 686 A.2d 298 (1996).
85. See id. at 256-57, 686 A.2d at 299.
86. See supra notes 7, 17 and accompanying text.
87. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 256-57, 686 A.2d at 299.
88. The lock-box, which contains a key to the house, is a device placed on an en-
trance door of a house that is for sale. Upon entering the correct combina-
tion, an agent can gain access to the house to show a prospective buyer the
property without requiring the homeowner to be present. See id. at 259 n.3,
686 A.2d at 300 n.3.
89. The real estate listing contract and the lock-box agreement were standardized
contracts which were used in Montgomery and Prince George's Counties, re-
spectively. See id. at 257 n.2, 686 A.2d at 300 n.2.
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Neither REALTOR nor his agents or sub-agents are respon-
sible for vandalism, theft or damage of any nature whatso-
ever to the property, nor is REALTOR responsible for the
custody of the property, its management, maintenance, up-
keep or repair.93
The listing contract identified H.T. Brown as the Realtor.94 The list-
ing contract also provided that the Adloo's home would be available
for showing "at all reasonable hours."
95
For the convenience of the parties and to facilitate the sale of
the home, the Adloos signed an additional agreement that author-
ized the use of a lock-box on their home.96 The lock-box enabled
real estate brokers to obtain access to the home when the Adloos
were not present.9
The lock-box agreement advised the Adloos to safeguard their
valuables and contained the following language:
SELLER further acknowledges that neither Listing or Sell-
ing BROKER nor their agents are an insurer against the
loss of personal property; SELLER agrees to waive and re-
leases BROKER and his agents and/or cooperating agents
and brokers from any responsibility therefore [sic] .98
After the Adloos executed both contracts, a client coordinator
employed at H.T. Brown received a phone call from a man who
purported to be an agent of Shannon & Luchs, another real estate
brokerage firm.99 The man inquired about the combination to the
lock-box on the Adloo's home for the purpose of showing it to a
prospective buyer.10 After complying with H.T. Brown's established
policy of verifying the caller and the caller's affiliation with the
93. Id.
94. See Brief for Respondent at 2, Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md.
254, 686 A.2d 298 (1996) (No. 143).
95. Adloo, 344 Md. at 257, 686 A.2d at 300.
96. See id. at 257-58, 686 A.2d at 300. The listing contract was a standardized real-
tor contract used in Montgomery County. See id. at 258 n.2, 686 A.2d at 300
n.2; supra note 89. The lock-box agreement was a standardized contract used
in Prince George's County. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 258 n.2, 686 A.2d at 300 n.2;
supra note 89. Both forms are copyrighted agreements provided by the respec-
tive County Association Board of Realtors. See Brief for Petitioners at 5, Adloo
v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 686 A.2d 298 (1996) (No. 143).






named agency, the employee gave the caller the combination to the
lock-box on the Adloo's home.'0'
Subsequently, H.T. Brown learned that the caller was not an
agent of Shannon & Luch's.'0 2 Moreover, no license had ever been
issued by the Maryland Real Estate Commission in the caller's
name.10 3 The caller was an imposter who entered the Adloo's home
by way of the key in the lock-box and absconded with cash, jewelry,
and other property totaling approximately $40,000.0 4
The Adloos filed suit against H.T. Brown in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County to collect damages arising from H.T.
Brown's alleged negligence. 105 Despite H.T. Brown's argument that
the exculpatory clauses released it from liability, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the Adloos for $20,000.106 The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment of the circuit court.
07
In an unreported opinion, 108 the court of special appeals held that
the exculpatory clause in the lock-box agreement exonerated H.T.
Brown from any liability.09
B. The Holding and Rationale
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari and re-
jected the intermediate court's holding. 10 The court of appeals held
that unless a clause "clearly, unequivocally, specifically, and unmis-
takably expressed the parties' intention to exculpate [H.T Brown]
from liability resulting from its own negligence, the clause is insuffi-
cient for that purpose.""' The Adloo court concluded that the con-
tract clauses at issue failed to clearly exculpate H.T. Brown from lia-
bility resulting from its own negligence."l 2 The Adloo court
announced that an exculpatory clause must manifest the parties' in-
101. See id. The policy did not call for an independent investigation, but rather a
simple phone call to the number that the caller gave to H.T. Brown Real Es-
tate, Inc. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 258-59, 686 A.2d at 300.
105. See id. at 259, 686 A.2d at 300. The filing of the suit came after the Adloos
filed and settled a claim with their insurance company. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 106 Md. App. 765 (1995).
109. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 259, 686 A.2d at 300.
110. See id. at 259, 267, 686 A.2d at 300, 305.
111. Id. at 267, 686 A.2d at 305.
112. See id. at 268, 686 A.2d at 305.
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tentions in clear, unequivocal, specific, and unmistakable lan-
guage, 1 3 thereby adopting a more exacting standard than had previ-
ously been applied by Maryland courts.
Judicial scrutiny is heightened when courts interpret exculpa-
tory clauses. 1 4 Exculpatory clauses are strictly construed against the
drafter. An elevated degree of clarity is necessary to make an excul-
patory clause functional." 5 This is a higher standard than courts ap-
ply to other types of contractual provisions. 16 To survive a court's
heightened level of scrutiny, the contractual language disclaiming
tort liability must be, among other things, unmistakable." 7
Although Adloo involved two separate contracts that each in-
cluded exculpatory provisions, the court of appeals identified the
provision in the lock-box agreement as critical and examined that
provision first."' After careful analysis, the court determined that
the exculpatory provision in the lock-box agreement was ambigu-
ous, and its scope was at best unclear.1 9 Therefore, the provision
was insufficient for the purpose of exculpating the real estate
agency from liability resulting from its own negligence.
20
The court analyzed the two exculpatory clauses in the lock-box
agreement separately. The first clause, "SELLER further acknowl-
edges that neither Listing or Selling BROKER nor their agents are
an insurer against the loss of personal property,"' 2' placed the
homeowner on notice that any loss of personal property will not be
113. See id. at 267-68, 686 A.2d at 305.
114. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Doyle v. Bowdoin College,
403 A.2d 1206, 1207-08 (Me. 1979) (applying a heightened level of scrutiny
when construing a clause that attempted to relieve a hockey clinic from liabil-
ity for its own negligence); Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 308 (N.Y 1979)
(recognizing that an exculpatory clause set forth in a parachute training
center's contract was subject to close judicial scrutiny); Dilks v. Flohr Chevro-
let, Inc., 192 A.2d 682, 687-88 (Pa. 1963) (construing a contractual clause
strictly against the party seeking its protection).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 16-25 for a discussion of the level of scru-
tiny courts employ when construing exculpatory clauses.
116. See Colgan v. Agway, 553 A.2d 143, 145 (Vt. 1988).
117. See id. A leading commentator explained: "If an express agreement exempting
the defendant from liability for his negligence is to be sustained, it must ap-
pear that its terms were brought home to the plaintiff .... It is also necessary
that the expressed terms of the agreement be applicable to the particular mis-
conduct of the defendant .. E.." K ETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 68, at 483-84.
118. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 267, 686 A.2d at 305.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 258, 686 A.2d at 300.
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compensated for by the listing agent.'22 The second clause,
"SELLER agrees to waive and releases BROKER and his agents
and/or cooperating agents and brokers from any responsibility
therefore [sic],"'1 23 works to clear the real estate agency from any
loss of personal property that may result from the use of their
services. 1
24
The court found that the exculpatory clauses in the lock-box
agreement could be interpreted to apply only to those situations
where, without the negligence of the broker, personal property is
stolen from the seller.125 In other words, a reasonable person may
logically interpret these clauses to apply only where a potential
buyer wanders through the house and pilfers certain personal prop-
erty from the seller, without the knowledge or negligence of the
broker. The Adloo court determined that these clauses do not sug-
gest a broader intent-they cannot be construed to exclude theft
resulting from the broker's own negligence.
26
The court then analyzed the exculpatory clause in the listing
contract. 127 The court concluded that the exculpatory clause in the
listing contract was insufficient because "there simply [was] no
clear, unequivocal expression of the parties' intention" that the ex-
clusion applied to "damage or injury caused by the [broker's] own
negligence."
128
The Adloo court pointed out that the word "negligence" does
not need to be present in an exculpatory provision, nor is any other
talismanic phrase required to connote the idea of negligence. 29 An
exculpatory provision is sufficient to relieve one party from their lia-
bility for its own negligence as long as the provision is a "clear, une-
quivocal expression of the parties' intention that include[s] in that
exclusion . . . damage or injury caused by the [party's] own
negligence."
30
122. See supra text accompanying note 98.
123. Adloo, 344 Md. at 258, 686 A.2d at 300.
124. See supra text accompanying note 98.
125. See id. at 267-68, 686 A.2d at 305.
126. See id. at 268, 686 A.2d at 305.
127. See supra text accompanying note 93.
128. Adloo, 344 Md. at 268, 686 A.2d at 305.
129. See id. at 266, 686 A.2d at 304 (citing Hardage Enters. v. Fidesys Corp., 570 So.
2d 436, 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 923
S.W.2d 330, 335-36 (Mo. 1996); Audley v. Melton, 640 A.2d 777, 778-79 (N.H.
1994)).
130. Adloo, 344 Md. at 268, 686 A.2d at 305.
[Vol. 27
Adloo v. H.T. Brown
Accordingly, the sufficiency of the exculpatory provisions in the
lock-box agreement and the listing contract turned on the intention
of the parties. Under Maryland's objective law of contracts, the in-
tent of the parties is ascertained by the nomenclature of the provi-
sions.13' The court concluded that the exculpatory provisions in the
lock-box agreement and the listing contract were insufficient to ex-
culpate the broker from liability for its own negligence because




The following analysis concentrates on the standard adopted by
the Adloo court. The analysis begins with a discussion of the mini-
mal level of guidance provided to practitioners by the court, then
advocates an alternative, bright-line rule similar to precedents es-
poused in other jurisdictions. The analysis concludes with proposed
language for exculpatory clauses that should comply with the new
standard adopted in Adloo.
A. The Adloo Standard
The Adloo court attempted to create a more exacting standard
for evaluating exculpatory clauses. 33 When a party desires to insu-
late itself from liability for its own negligent acts, the language used
in the exculpatory clause must specifically, and in certain terms, ex-
culpate that party from its own conduct. 34 While the Adloo court
alerted contracting parties of the necessity to include precise excul-
patory language in contracts, the court did not offer any intelligible
guidance for the decreed standard. The Adloo holding seems to cre-
ate a concrete standard. However, the court failed to develop the
standard beyond its vague command that the language used in ex-
culpatory clauses must "clearly, unequivocally, specifically, and un-
mistakably"' 35 convey the parties' intent to exculpate one party from
its own negligence liability. Thus, even after Adloo, the Maryland
standard on the law of exculpatory clauses still remains amorphous.
Applying the Adloo standard may produce inconsistent and un-
foreseeable outcomes. Regardless of how clear contract language ap-
pears to the parties, courts will continue to split hairs over the spe-
131. See id. at 267, 686 A.2d at 305; supra text accompanying note 58.






cific words used. 136 In construing the language of a contract, courts
should keep in mind that " [c]larity of language, like ambiguity, is a
relative and not an absolute concept."'137 As Adloo demonstrates, with
a little imagination, a skillful litigator can create a plausible argu-
ment that seemingly straightforward language is ambiguous. The
more exacting standard created in Adloo is concrete only on its face.
Under Adloo, a practitioner cannot be certain that the contract
drafted contains the level of clarity required to effectively exculpate
a party from liability arising from the party's own negligence. In-
stead, drafters must decipher the standard using a trial and error
approach until the courts provide more useful guidance. Thus, the
amorphous standard adopted provides little more than a judicial ca-
veat to future drafters.
B. Approaches in Other Jurisdictions
1. Decisions Persuasive to the Adloo Court
Other jurisdictions have also addressed the validity of exculpa-
tory clauses and the precise language required to create an effective
exculpatory clause. Several courts apply the same analysis as used by
the Adloo court.'38 The standard set forth in these jurisdictions, as in
136. See Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143, 145 (Vt. 1988).
137. Id. (citing SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 609, at
402-04 (W. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961)).
138. See Michel v. Merrill Stevens Dry Dock Co., 554 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989) (recognizing that a clause conveying clear and unequivocal intent
to relieve a party from liability due to negligence is valid and enforceable);
Larsen v. Vic Tanny Int'l, 474 N.E.2d 729, 731 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) (reiterating
that an exculpatory clause follows the general rule of being construed against
its author); Baker v. Stewarts', Inc., 433 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1988) (holding
that a clause attempting to absolve a party from liability due to his own negli-
gence would not "cover such negligence unless the intention to do so is
clearly expressed"); Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo.
1996) (explaining that, because exculpatory clauses are strictly construed
against the author, a contract which exonerates a party from acts of negli-
gence must contain clear and explicit language to that effect); Audley v. Mel-
ton, 640 A.2d 777, 779 (N.H. 1994) (holding that an exculpatory clause must
clearly and specifically indicate the intent to release a party from liability due
to that party's own negligence; a general release will not suffice); Colgan v.
Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143, 145 (Vt. 1988) (stating that "a greater degree of clar-
ity" is required for an exculpatory clause than is required for other variations
of contract clauses); see also University Plaza Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Stewart, 272
So. 2d 507, 509 (Fla. 1973) (applying the same strict analysis of an exculpatory
clause to an indemnity clause in an indemnity contract).
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Adloo, can be characterized as "a stringent and exacting one, under
which the clause must not simply be unambiguous but also under-
standable."'39 In these jurisdictions, courts are extremely reluctant
to use longstanding rules of contractual construction to find an im-
plicit meaning of an exculpatory provision-the meaning must be
specifically stated in the contract 4°
In reaching its holding, the Adloo court found several cases
from other jurisdictions persuasive. To fully appreciate the standard
adopted by the Adloo court, a complete analysis requires a brief dis-
cussion of these cases.
The Adloo court first discussed Audley v. Melton,' 4' a case
brought by a fashion model to recover damages against a photogra-
pher.142 While posing during a photo shoot at the photographer's
studio, an adult male lion being used in the shoot bit the fashion
model's head. 43 The fashion model sued on grounds alleging negli-
gence, and the photographer moved to dismiss the complaint based
on an exculpatory clause in their contract.144
The Audley court found that the exculpatory clause was insuffi-
cient to protect the photographer from liability resulting from his
own negligence because "[q]uite simply, the general release lan-
guage [did] not satisfy the ... requirement that 'the contract must
clearly state that the defendant is not responsible for the conse-
quences of his negligence.' 1145 The contract failed to clearly excul-
139. Adloo, 344 Md. at 264, 686 A.2d at 303 (citing Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 334).
140. See Poslosky v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 349 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo. 1961)
(citing Meyer Jewelry Co. v. Professional Bldg. Co., 307 S.W.2d 517, 520-21
(Mo. Ct. App. 1957); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 262, at 644 (1963)).
141. 640 A.2d 777 (N.H. 1994).
142. See id. at 778.
143. See id.
144. See id. The exculpatory clause at issue provided:
I Shannon Audley realize that working with the [sic] wild and poten-
tially dangerous animals (i.e. lion, white tiger, hawk) can create a
hazardous [sic] situation, resulting in loss of life or limb. I take all re-
sponsibility upon myself for any event as described above that may
take place. I hold Bill Melton and T.I.G.E.R.S. or any of their agents
free of any or all liability. I am signing this of my on [sic] free will.
Id.
145. Id. at 779 (quoting Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Ass'n, 509 A.2d 151, 154
(N.H. 1986)); see also Wenzel v. Boyles Galvanizing Co., 920 F.2d 778, 781 (11 th
Cir. 1991); O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 447 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982) (holding that in order to be enforceable, an exculpatory clause
must unambiguously indicate which risks are assumed); Baker v. Stewarts',
Inc., 433 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1988); Brown v. Racquetball Ctrs., Inc., 534
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pate the photographer "because no particular attention [was] called
to the notion of releasing the [photographer] from liability for his
own negligence.' ' 46 The general language used in the clause did
not effectively put the party it was used against, the fashion model,
on clear notice of this intent.
147
The Adloo court also relied on Baker v. Stewarts', Inc.148 The
Baker court addressed the sufficiency of an exculpatory clause relied
on by a cosmetology school in an effort to relieve itself from liabil-
ity for the negligence of its supervisory personnel. 49 A cosmetology
student, under the supervision of two instructors, applied a chemi-
cal to straighten a customer's hair 50 The customer sued for dam-
ages when her hair fell out, alleging that the supervisors were negli-
gent.' 5' The court found the exculpatory clause insufficient to
exonerate the school from liability for the negligence of its supervi-
sory personnel because it lacked a clear and unequivocally ex-
pressed intent to do so. 5 The court reasoned that a casual reader
asked to sign the written waiver would not find it apparent that the
waiver absolved the school from liability based upon the acts or
omissions of its professional, supervisory staff.'53
The Adloo court's reliance on the holdings in Audley and Baker
implies that Maryland demands language comparable to the lan-
guage required in these respective jurisdictions. Moreover, the Adloo
court's stringent and exact language requirement will be applied to
all types of exculpatory contract clauses, not simply exculpatory
clauses in real estate contracts.
A.2d 842, 843 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (stating that in order to find an exculpa-
tory clause enforceable, the language must spell out the intention of the par-
ties with the greatest of particularity).
146. Audley, 640 A.2d at 779.
147. See id.
148. 433 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1988).
149. The clause provided:
I . . .do hereby acknowledge that this is a student training facility
and thus there is a price consideration less than would be charged in
a salon. Therefore, I will not hold the Stewart School, its manage-
ment, owners, agents or students liable for any damage or injury,
should any result from this service.
Id. at 706-07.
150. See id. at 707.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 709.
153. See id. ("To construe the agreement in this light would be contrary to the re-
quirement . . . that such intention must be clearly and unequivocally ex-
pressed.").
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2. Decisions Contrary to Adloo
Other jurisdictions take a different approach from Adloo when
interpreting the language of exculpatory clauses. 154 The decisions
discussed below are frequently cited by other courts and legal au-
thors, thus exemplifying a differing philosophy of judicial thinking.
In these jurisdictions, the Adloo standard is simply inadequate.
For instance, in Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 
55
the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether the fair notice require-
ments of the conspicuousness doctrine and the express negligence
doctrine applied to the exculpatory clause in dispute.156 The court
held that a valid exculpatory clause requires fair notice, which in
turn requires a court to consider both the conspicuousness and ex-
press negligence doctrines.
1 57
In order to create a valid exculpatory clause under the express
negligence doctrine, the intent to exculpate one party from its own
negligence must be expressed in specific terms within the four cor-
ners of the contract.'58 The conspicuousness doctrine "mandates
'that something must appear on the face of the [contract] to attract
the attention of a reasonable person when [the person] looks at
it.' "159 The standards announced by the Texas court, although simi-
lar in substance, are more demanding and concrete than those
promulgated in Adloo. A party seeking to release itself from liability
must explicitly state that intention in the contract, and express the
intention in a way that alerts a reasonable person.
In Gross v. Sweet,160 the Court of Appeals of New York held that
a valid exculpatory provision requires the word "negligence" or
"words conveying a similar import."161 The court indicated that with-
out these words, it would not infer that an injured party "was aware
of, much less intended to accept, any enhanced exposure to injury
occasioned by the carelessness of the very persons on which he de-
pended for his safety."
62
154. See infra notes 155-72 and accompanying text.
155. 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993).
156. See id. at 507.
157. See id. at 508.
158. See id. (citing Enserch Corp. v. Parker, 794 S.W.2d 2, 8 (Tex. 1990); Ethyl
Corp. v. Daniel Const. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Tex. 1987)).
159. Id. at 508 (quoting Ling & Co. v. Trinity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 482 S.W.2d 841,
843 (Tex. 1972)) (emphasis added).
160. 400 N.E.2d 306 (N.Y 1979).
161. Id. at 311.
162. Id. at 310-11.
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The New York court revisited the topic of exculpatory contracts
in Geise v. County of Niagara.'63 In Geise, the court relied on the opin-
ion in Gross, and held that because words referring to the "neglect"
or "fault" of the defendant were not in the clause, the exculpatory
provision was invalid. 164 The absence of these words resulted in an
uninformed plaintiff-one that could not appreciate which en-
hanced risks he has agreed to absolve.
65
Maine courts have also addressed similar exculpatory clause is-
sues. In Doyle v. Bowdoin College,166 a contract containing a release,
executed by the parents of a child injured during a hockey clinic,
did not expressly refer to Bowdoin College's liability for their own
negligence. 67 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the
clause failed to fulfill the court's required standard of stating, "with
the greatest particularity," the intent to release a party from liability
for negligence.1 68 Furthermore, the court noted that the clause was
insufficient because it failed to mention that it immunized Bowdoin
College or its agents from claims of negligence. 169
Delaware's high court addressed exculpatory clauses and es-
poused a clearer standard of the requisite language than that set
forth in Adloo. In Blum v. Kauffman,170 the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware held that a contract must clearly and unequivocally express the
parties' intent to grant immunity from one party's negligence. 17'
163. 458 N.YS.2d 162 (1983).
164. See id. at 164 (citing Gross, 400 N.E.2d at 309-10).
165. See id.
166. 403 A.2d 1206 (Me. 1979).
167. See id. at 1208. The clause provided:
I understand that neither Bowdoin College nor anyone associated with the
Hockey Clinic will assume any responsibility for accidents and medical or den-
tal expenses incurred as a result of participation in this program .... I
understand that I must furnish proof of health and accident insur-
ance coverage acceptable to the College .... [signed] Leonard F.
Doyle (emphasis added). I fully understand that Bowdoin College, its
employees or servants will accept no responsibility for or on account of any
injury or damage sustained by Brian arising out of the activities of the
said THE CLINIC. I do, therefore, agree to assume all risk of injury or dam-
age to the person or property of Brian arising out of the activities of
the said THE CLINIC. . . . [signed] Margaret C. Doyle (emphasis
added).
Id. at 1207.
168. See id. at 1208.
169. See id. at 1209.
170. 297 A.2d 48 (Del. 1972).
171. See id. at 49.
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The court held that the contract could not be a clear and unequiv-
ocal expression of the intent to exculpate a party from its own neg-
ligence without using the word "negligence."
172
Although Maryland's common law on exculpatory clauses be-
came more demanding after Adloo, it has not reached the pinnacle
of exactness required for effective exculpatory language as com-
pelled by Texas, New York, Maine, and Delaware. The aforemen-
tioned cases in those states demonstrate a more exacting, bright-line
standard than that adopted by the Adloo court.
Arguably, the more appropriate standard for the Adloo court to
have adopted would have been a bright-line test similar to those dis-
cussed above. 173 A strict, clear, and exact rule would alleviate Mary-
land's amorphous standard on exculpatory clauses. Moreover, a
bright-line standard would allow Maryland courts to rule on excul-
patory clause issues without the need to interpret both the inconsis-
tent dictates of the Adloo decision and the clause at issue.
Recently, in Cornell v. Council of Unit Owners Hawaiian Village
Condominiums, Inc., 174 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland reviewed an exculpatory clause and applied Mary-
land law. 75 In applying the Adloo standard, 76 the court held that the
language "any other person" 77 contained in the disputed clause was
sufficient to release the party relying on the clause from its own
negligence liability.178 The Cornell court reasoned that the broad lan-
guage, "any other person," evinced a clear intent to absolve the
party from its own negligence.
179
The underlying theory behind the Adloo decision was to dis-
courage general release language in exculpatory clauses to ensure
that a party could reasonably interpret the terms of the clause.
Clearly, the phrase "any other person" is general release language.
In Adloo, similarly broad language, "any nature whatsoever" and "any
responsibility therefore," was held insufficient to exculpate a party
172. See id.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 155-72.
174. 983 F. Supp. 640 (D. Md. 1997).
175. See Cornell v. Council of Unit Owners Hawaiian Village Condominiums, Inc.,
983 F. Supp. 640 (D. Md. 1997); see also infra notes 238-43 and accompanying
text.
176. See Cornel4 983 F. Supp. at 644.
177. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.




from liability for its own negligence. 180 However, the Cornell court
found that the phrase "any other person" was sufficiently precise to
exculpate a party to the contract from its own negligence under the
Adloo standard. 181 This recent federal court decision indicates that
the Adloo standard did little to clarify Maryland's common law on
exculpatory clauses.
The confusion stems from inconsistencies in the Adloo court's
holding. The Adloo court held that an exculpatory clause must
"clearly, unequivocally, specifically, and unmistakably express the par-
ties' intention to exculpate the [party] from its own negligence."
182
However, the decision proceeded to explain that if the language of
the clause at issue had suggested a "broader intent," it would have
sufficed to exculpate H.T. Brown from their own negligence.
83
Thus, the inconsistency that the Adloo court's holding created was
the idea that broader language could be more specific.
The logical way to put a party on notice as to the other party's
intent is to expressly state that intent as required by the express
negligence doctrine. 84 Well-defined, explicit terms are more likely
to alert all parties involved that one party is being released from fu-
ture liability for their own negligent acts. 85 Without requiring the
word "negligence" or words of similar import, a requirement which
the Adloo court expressly refused to adopt, 86 it is uncertain how
there can be a clear, specific, unequivocal, and unmistakable ex-
pression of the parties' intent.87 Moreover, a party should be re-
180. Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 267-68, 686 A.2d 298, 305
(1996).
181. See Cornell, 983 F. Supp. at 644. The Cornell court read Adloo to stand for the
following:
Although the clause does not use the word "negligence", under Adloo
any substantial equivalent will suffice, and the broad language of the
clause exempting the Council from liability for personal injuries
caused by "any other person" evinces the Council's clear intention to
absolve itself from liability for its negligent actions. Accordingly, this
case is distinguishable from Adloo ... because the clause's language
broadly covers all personal injuries caused by any person ....
Id. The Cornell court relied on Home Indemnity Co. v. Basiliko, 245 Md. 412, 226
A.2d 258 (1967), to reconcile its outcome with the Adloo court's decision. See
id.
182. Adloo, 344 Md. at 267, 686 A.2d at 305 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 268, 686 A.2d at 305 (emphasis added).
184. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
185. See Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo. 1996).
186. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 266, 686 A.2d at 304.
187. See Blum v. Kauffman, 297 A.2d 48, 49 (Del. 1972) (explaining that without
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quired to specifically set forth the intent to be released from liabil-
ity for their own negligent acts. In an effort to preserve the parties'
freedom of contract, the Adloo court's refusal to adopt a bright-line
standard effectively postponed, and perhaps multiplied the instances
when courts will be called upon to interpret contracts containing
exculpatory clauses.
1 88
C. Invalidation Based on Policy and the Tunkl v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of California Analysis
As a threshold matter, the Adloo court construed the language
of the contract to determine if the exculpatory clause was
sufficiently crafted. 189 Initially, the court could have examined the
three exceptional circumstances when an exculpatory clause is inva-
lid as discussed in Winterstein.190 These three exceptions may have
enabled the Adloo court to reach the same conclusion by invalidat-
ing the clause on policy grounds. However, in order to invalidate an
exculpatory clause based on one of the three Winterstein exceptions,
the court must first presume or find that a valid exculpatory clause
exists. Thus, the Adloo court correctly recognized that the threshold
issue of determining the sufficiency of the language of the exculpa-
tory clause logically must precede analyzing the clause's validity as
there is no need to determine whether an exculpatory clause is void
under an exceptional circumstance if no exculpatory clause exists
for the purpose asserted.'
Other courts fail to treat language as a threshold issue. Instead,
these courts begin their analysis by questioning whether an exculpa-
tory clause would be valid from a policy standpoint, regardless
whether the language of the clause was sufficiently precise to excul-
pate the party relying on it.192 In doing so, these courts initially look
the word "negligence" the Agreement does not "clearly and unequivocally
spell[] out [such] intent"); see also Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337 (explaining that
without the words " 'negligence' or 'fault' or their equivalents," there is no
clear and unmistakable waiver).
188. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
189. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 261, 686 A.2d at 301-02 (identifying the construction of
the language of the exculpatory clause as the threshold issue).
190. See Winterstein v. Wilcom, 16 Md. App. 130, 135-36, 293 A.2d 821, 824-25
(1972).
191. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 261, 686 A.2d at 301.
192. See Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522 (1994); see also Winterstein, 16 Md.
App. 130, 293 A.2d 821 (1972) (assessing the validity of an exculpatory clause




to the exceptional circumstances that act to invalidate exculpatory
provisions.
One of the three circumstances discussed at length in Winter-
stein was the public interest exception. In discussing the public in-
terest exception, the Winterstein court adopted the six-factor test 93
formulated in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California.94
In Tunkl, the California Supreme Court held that an exculpa-
tory clause signed by a patient that released a charitable hospital
from future negligence was invalid because it violated the public's
interest. 95 To determine whether the exculpatory clause violated the
public's interest, the court viewed the circumstances of the contract
in light of the following six-factor test: whether (1) the type of busi-
ness was generally thought suitable for public regulation; (2) the
party seeking relief from liability was performing an important ser-
vice for the public, or providing the public with a necessity; (3) the
party presented itself as willing to perform the service to any mem-
ber of the public, or those that met certain criteria; (4) the party
seeking relief from liability was at a bargaining advantage due to
the nature or economics of the service; (5) due to the superior bar-
gaining power, the party presented a standardized contract of adhe-
sion that contained no provision for the buyer to obtain protection
from the seller's negligence; and (6) as a result of the agreement,
the person or property of the buyer was placed under the seller's
control and subjected to the risk and carelessness of the seller. 96 In
order for an activity to rise to the level of one that affects the pub-
lic interest under the Tunkl analysis, "the agreement need only ful-
fill some of the characteristics" 197 of the six-factor test.
Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has expressly re-
jected the Tunkl analysis as a definitive public interest test,198 other
193. See Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 136-37, 293 A.2d at 825.
194. 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963).
195. See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 441-42.
196. See id. at 445-46; see also Alevizatos, supra note 34, at 741 & n.74 (citing Tunk4
383 P.2d at 445-46).
197. Tunk4 383 P.2d at 447.
198. See Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 535, 644 A.2d 522, 527 (1994) (explaining that
the court expressly declined to adopt the six-factor test set forth in Tunkl, but
it is not to say that the factors listed cannot be considered by a court in deter-
mining whether a transaction affects public interest). This six-factor test in-
cludes two of the three exceptions announced by the Adloo court-the public
interest exception and the unequal bargaining power exception. See Adloo v.
H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 260, 686 A.2d 298, 301 (1996).
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jurisdictions continue to strictly apply the factors. 199 For example, in
Wagenblast v. Odessa School District,2°° the Washington Supreme Court
"sought to establish a principled basis" for determining whether a
school district could contract out of negligence liability in interscho-
lastic athletics using an exculpatory clause. 20 1 In resolving the issue,
the court adopted the Tunkl test, as did numerous other
jurisdictions. 20 2
Other jurisdictions that have declined to adopt the Tunkl test
do not apply uniform sets of criteria to the public interest excep-
tion. For example, Idaho bans exculpatory clauses only when they
are the product of unequal bargaining power or involve a public
duty, not considering the remaining four Tunkl criteria.20 3 Likewise,
Kansas has enumerated an open-ended test where an exculpatory
clause is found invalid if it harms "the interests of the public, con-
travenes some established interest of society, violates some public
statute, or tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety." 2°4
New Hampshire courts take an extreme approach and disallow all
exculpatory clauses under the rationale that contracts which bargain
away common law duties of care are invalid. 205 The disparity be-
tween the states on the public interest exception illustrates the diffi-
culties courts face in dealing with exculpatory clauses.
2°6
Although Maryland rejected the Tunkl test as determinative, the
test continues to be used as an aid in determining whether a trans-
199. See Alevizatos, supra note 34, at n.17. In addition to California, other states fol-
low the Tunkl test. See, e.g., Morgan v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d
107, 117 (Ala. 1985); Municipality of Anchorage v. Locker, 723 P.2d 1261, 1265
(Alaska 1986); Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 275 S.E.2d 163, 167-68 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1980), affd, 282 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. 1981); LaFrenz v. Lake County Fair Bd.,
360 N.E.2d 605, 608-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank, 627
P.2d 1247, 1251-52 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); Lee v. Consolidated Edison Co., 407
N.YS.2d 777, 787 (N.Y Civ. Ct. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 413 N.YS.2d 826
(N.Y App. Term. 1978); Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1977);
Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 973 (Wash. 1988).
200. 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988).
201. See Recent Case, Negligence-Exculpatory Clauses-School Districts Cannot Contract
Out of Negligence Liability in Interscholastic Athletics-Wagenblast v. Odessa School
District, 102 HAIv. L. Rrv. 729, 730 (1989).
202. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
203. See Rawlings v. Layne & Bowler Pump Co., 465 P.2d 107, 111 (Idaho 1970).
204. Hunter v. American Rentals, Inc., 371 P.2d 131, 133-34 (Kan. 1962).
205. See Papakalos v. Shaka, 18 A.2d 377, 379 (N.H. 1941) (referring to the general
rule that one may not contractually relieve himself from the consequences of
the future nonperformance of his common law duty of care).
206. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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action affects public interest.20 7 If the Adloo court had conducted a
Tunkl analysis, perhaps the outcome would have been the same, but
for a different reason. Applying the Adloo facts to the Tunkl test il-
lustrates that the exculpatory clause may have violated the public in-
terest standard.
First, the real estate industry is suitable for public regulation;
indeed, it is currently regulated in Maryland.208 Second, the practi-
cal necessity of a real estate agency is clear. Although it is entirely
possible to sell a home privately, the substantial advantage one re-
ceives from a multiple real estate listing is usually accessible by bro-
kers only. Third, a real estate agency will provide service to any
member of the public. Anti-discrimination statutes20 9 and anti-
discrimination policies adopted by agencies reflect the willingness to
provide service to all members of the public. The fourth factor in-
volves bargaining power. Real estate contracts are standardized,
copyrighted form agreements used by most brokers in each county.
Arguably, the Adloos had an avenue of relief because they were free
to negotiate the exculpatory clause in their contract. Even if negoti-
ation was possible, however, simply failing to establish one of the
factors of the Tunkl test is not determinative, 210 as the test is some-
what malleable.
Clearly, the fifth factor could have been established under the
facts of Adcloo because no clause in the Adloos' standard contract of
adhesion enabled them to buy insurance for the broker's negli-
gence. 211 It follows that the final factor could be satisfied because
the installation of the lock-box allowed the broker control over en-
trance into the dwelling. Therefore, the Adloos were at the mercy
of the broker's negligence.
If the Adloo court presumed that the language conclusively es-
tablished an exculpatory clause, it might have looked to the excep-
tions that invalidate these clauses. Had the Adloo court applied the
Tunkl test to the facts of the case, it is likely that the court would
have concluded that the clause was void because it violated the pub-
lic's interest. Instead, the court correctly precluded this type of anal-
ysis by electing to construe the language of the exculpatory clause
207. See Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 535, 644 A.2d 522, 527 (1994) (explaining that
the test can be considered as one of many factors by a court).
208. See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. §§ 17-100 to -702 (1995).
209. See id. §§ 17-525 to -526.
210. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
211. See Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 257, 686 A.2d 298, 300
(1996).
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first, to determine whether the clause was sufficient for the purpose
that it was asserted.
D. Impact of Adloo in Maryland
Adloo is a significant development in Maryland law because the
court clearly announced that it was necessary to express the parties'
intentions with unambiguous language in order for an exculpatory
contract clause to be operative. 212 After Adloo, Maryland real estate
agents must spell out to homeowners the desire to be released from
liability caused by their own negligence. Currently, real estate bro-
kers may be reluctant to state this desire in clear, unambiguous lan-
guage because prospective sellers may find the terms offensive and
one-sided. Thus, brokers' concerns that sellers may be unwilling to
enter into a listing agreement with agencies that include explicit ex-
culpatory language in their contracts may cause real estate agencies
to abandon these clauses entirely.
Moreover, the Adloo court's demand for clarity has broad impli-
cations on future exculpatory clauses. The Adloo court was most
concerned with eliminating a party's effort to camouflage the true
intent of the exculpatory clause. In Adloo, the contract at issue was a
standardized contract. Thus, numerous outstanding contracts may
be insufficient for the purpose of exculpating a broker, and redraft-
ing may be necessary to accomplish the desired result of insulating
brokers from liability.
The nature of the activities that exculpatory clauses are in-
tended to cover differ widely. Accordingly, a wide variety of lan-
guage is used when drafting exculpatory clauses. The court in Adloo
made it clear that whatever language is used, it must be clear, une-
quivocal, specific, and unmistakable to be effective.
The scope of the Adloo opinion far exceeds the boundaries of
real estate contracts. Exculpatory contracts surface in many other
transactions. Participants in many recreational activities must sign
waiver release forms. These forms routinely contain exculpatory
provisions. For instance, ski resorts attempt to insulate themselves
from liability,213 as do health clubs,214 horse riding stables,215 white-
212. See id. at 267, 686 A.2d at 305.
213. See Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 796 (Vt. 1995) (reviewing an exculpa-
tory clause when a skier sustained injuries from hitting a metal pole on a ski
slope); Yauger v. Skiing Enters., 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Wis. 1996) (addressing an
exculpatory provision when a skier collided with a ski lift tower after signing a
waiver).
214. See Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Mo. 1996) (reviewing
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water rafting outfitters, 216 water ski clubs, 217 scuba diving shops,218
parachuting operations, 219 schools with athletic clubs,220 and organi-
zations hosting athletic events.
221
In addition to the sample of recreational activities mentioned
above, exculpatory provisions are also used in other routine transac-
tions such as medical visits, 2 22 leases,2
23 construction agreements, 224
an exculpatory clause in a health club membership contract after a member
was injured using an exercise machine).
215. See O'Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (examining an exculpatory provision when a visitor was injured
during a stampede of horses); Merten v. Nathan, 321 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Wis.
1982) (reviewing an equestrian release that contained an exculpatory clause
after a rider brought an action against a riding stable for injuries sustained
while riding a horse); Ruppa v. American States Ins. Co., 284 N.W.2d 318, 320
(Wis. 1979) (reviewing an exculpatory provision signed prior to a participant's
injury in a horse show).
216. See Murphy v. North Am. River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504, 507 (W. Va.
1991) (addressing an exculpatory clause signed by a participant prior to being
injured during a white-water rafting expedition).
217. See Dobratz v. Thomson, 468 N.W.2d 654, 655 (Wis. 1991) (examining an ex-
culpatory provision when a water ski boat ran over a skier).
218. See Hewitt v. Miller, 521 P.2d 244, 244-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (considering
an exculpatory provision signed by a scuba diving student who disappeared
during a diving class).
219. SeeJones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 372 (Colo. 1981) (reviewing an exculpatory
provision that a parachuter signed before the airplane that was transporting
him crashed); Boucher v. Riner, 68 Md. App. 539, 539, 514 A.2d 485, 486
(1986) (examining an exculpatory clause in a contract signed by a parachut-
ing school student prior to being electrocuted when he collided with a power
line).
220. See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 969 (Wash. 1988); see also
supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
221. See Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Community Ass'n, 418 S.E.2d 894, 894 (Va. 1992)
(addressing an exculpatory provision in a pre-injury release form signed by a
competitor in a Triathalon competition).
222. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 441-42 (Cal. 1963); Thorton
v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 213 S.E.2d 102, 104 (W. Va. 1975).
223. See Key Biscayne Divers, Inc. v. Marine Stadium Enters., 490 So. 2d 137, 137-38
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, 111 A.2d 425, 426 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955); Bowlby-Harman Lumber Co. v. Commodore Servs.,
107 S.E.2d 602, 604 (W. Va. 1959); College Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc. v.
Hoffman, 241 N.W.2d 174, 175 (Wis. 1976).
224. See Hardage Enters. v. Fidesys Corp., 570 So. 2d 436, 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990); Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143, 144 (Vt. 1988) (discussing whether
a paragraph in a contract in fact released the contractor from liability);
Reeder v. Western Gas & Power Co., 256 P.2d 825 (Wash. 1953); Cassella v.
Weirton Constr. Co., 241 S.E.2d 924, 925 (W. Va. 1978).
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investments, 225 burglar alarm services, 226 banking,227 sale of goods,
2 8
public transportation, 229 personal services, 230 and waivers covering
passengers in a vehicle. 231 As illustrated, numerous exculpatory
agreements are created everyday in the course of ordinary dealing.
Adloo works to invalidate those that do not conform to Maryland's
new stringent and exacting standard.
E. Guidance for Drafters
When the Adloo standard is applied to particular contract lan-
guage, it does not necessarily yield an obvious result. With that in
mind, varying degrees of language are applicable in different in-
stances. Thus, the following proposals are not intended as absolute
rules to be applied to all circumstances.
Implicitly, the standard announced by the Adloo court was that
the word "negligence" or words of similar import must be used to
exculpate negligence, despite the court's reluctance to declare that
any particular word embodies talismanic qualities.2 32 A risk adverse
drafter should use the word "negligence" in all exculpatory clauses
dealing with negligence. By and large, if the intent of the parties is
to relieve one party from negligence, the fairest course of action is
for a drafter to explicitly provide that negligence claims are in-
cluded.2 33 To avoid "hiding" the intent of one party, it is necessary
225. See Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 527-28, 644 A.2d 522, 523-24 (1994) (addressing
an exculpatory clause in a broker engagement form after an investor sued for
lost value in her portfolio).
226. See Continental Video Corp. v. Honeywell, Inc., 422 So. 2d 35, 36 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Ace Formal Wear, Inc. v. Baker Protective Serv., 416 So. 2d 8,
9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281,
286, 533 A.2d 1316, 1318 (1987).
227. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nester, 309 U.S. 582, 585 (1940); Sporsem v.
First Nat'l Bank, 233 P. 641, 642 (Wash. 1925).
228. See McBride v. Minstar, Inc., 662 A.2d 592, 596 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994); Haugen v. Ford Motor Co., 219 N.W.2d 462 (N.D. 1974).
229. See Horelick v. Pennsylvania R.R., 99 A.2d 652 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953).
230. See Baker v. Stewarts', Inc., 433 N.W.2d 706, 706-07 (Iowa 1988) (pertaining to
an exculpatory provision in a hair stylist training center form signed by a cus-
tomer).
231. See Richards v. Richards, 513 N.W.2d 118, 119 (Wis. 1994) (addressing an ex-
culpatory provision within a passenger authorization form signed by a truck
driver's wife so that she could accompany him on his route).
232. See Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 266, 686 A.2d 298, 304
(1996) (stating that "the exculpatory clause need not contain or use the word
'negligence' or any other 'magic words' ").
233. See Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 220 N.YS.2d 962, 964 (1961) (analyzing a
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to expressly state that intent within the four corners of the
document.
34
The most common word of similar import to negligence is
"fault."235 If a drafter does not include the word "negligence," then
the closest phrase on the negligence continuum that will convey the
same theme is fault. The use of the word fault has been interpreted
as an equivalent of "negligence"; therefore, clauses containing fault
should be valid. 236 The term fault, when used conspicuously, creates
a clear and unmistakable waiver, 237 likely to satisfy the Adloo
standard.
Cornell v. Council of Unit Owners Hawaiian Village Condominiums,
Inc.,238 as discussed previously, was the first case to apply the Adloo
standard to an exculpatory clause. In applying Adloo to a bylaw pro-
vision,239 the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land held that the language which exempted the council from lia-
bility caused by "any other person" was a substantial equivalent to
the word "negligence." 240 The court rationalized that the phrase
"evinces the [drafter's] clear intention to absolve itself from liability
for its negligent actions." 241 However, the court also noted that this
clause where plaintiff agreed to assume full responsibility for any injuries that
might occur to her in or about defendant's premises, "including but without
limitation, any claims for personal injuries resulting from or arising out of the
negligence" of the defendant).
234. See Dresser Indus. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993)
(commenting that because exculpatory clauses are extraordinary attempts at
shifting risk, fair notice requirements must guide the analysis).
235. See Theroux v. Kedenburg Racing Ass'n, 269 N.YS.2d 789, 792 (1965) (examin-
ing an exculpatory clause which provided for release of liability for injury "re-
gardless of how such injury ... may arise, and regardless of who is at fault...
and even if the loss is caused by the neglect or fault of [the defendant]").
236. See Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo. 1996).
237. See id.
238. 983 . Supp. 640 (D. Md. 1997). For a further discussion of Cornel4 see supra
notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
239. See id. at 643. The clause provides:
The Council shall not be liable . . . for injury or damage to persons
or property caused by the elements, or by the Unit Owner of any
unit, or any other person, or resulting from electricity, water, snow,
or ice, which may leak or flow from any pipe, drain, conduit, appli-
ance, or equipment.
Id.
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case was distinguishable from Adloo because the language broadly
covered all personal injuries caused by any person.142 Once again,
language is relevant to the circumstances and cannot be relied
upon as an absolute concept.243
While the Adloo decision does not require the use of monosyl-
labic words, drafters should use simple words in an exculpatory
clause to avoid confusion. The language employed should be well
within the scope of common knowledge and usage.244 In addition,
exculpatory clauses should not contain legalese.
245
If a party intends on exculpating itself from liability, language
indicating that the party is not "assuming" or "accepting" responsi-
bility should be avoided. These words could be interpreted as
merely indicating an "unwillingness to shoulder any additional obli-
gation which the [drafter] would not otherwise bear."246 This inter-
pretation is reasonable because the use of this language leads one
to believe that the party relying on the exculpatory clause is agree-
ing to accept responsibility for his negligent conduct, a liability for
which that party already has responsibility.
247
Similarly, a drafter should not attempt to release himself from
liability for any "accidents" because this term is ambiguous. A rea-
sonable interpretation of the word accident precludes negligence
because an accident is an occasion "which could not have been pre-
vented by exercise of due care by both parties under circumstances
prevailing.
248
Releases containing general phrases such as a release "[from]
any and all responsibility or liability of any nature whatsoever for
any loss of property or personal injury ' 249 or to "hold [drafter]
harmless on account of any injury incurred 12 50 are normally held
unenforceable because their meanings are ambiguous and un-
clear.2 1 Therefore, it behooves the drafter to use "negligence,"
242. See id.
243. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
244. See Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143, 148 (Vt. 1988) (Peck, J., dissenting).
245. See id.
246. Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 (Me. 1979).
247. See id.
248. BLACK's LAW DIc'rIONARY 15 (6th ed. 1990) (defining unavoidable accident in
those terms); see also Dyle, 403 A.2d at 1208.
249. Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 177 N.YS.2d 587, 592 (1958).
250. Yauger v. Skiing Enters., 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Wis. 1996).
251. See Audley v. Melton, 640 A.2d 777, 778-79 (N.H. 1994) (citing Barnes v. New
Hampshire Karting Ass'n, 509 A.2d 151, 154 (N.H. 1986)); see also Wenzel v.
Boyles Galvanizing Co., 920 F.2d 778, 781 (lth Cir. 1991) (explaining that a
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"fault," or words of similar import to satisfy the Adloo standard, even
though the court did not require the use of any particular term.
252
Otherwise, the drafter risks failing to convey the desired intent to
the other party.
An exculpatory clause should be fashioned in a manner that
draws attention to the reader. Although conspicuousness was not ad-
dressed by the court in Adloo, it may be persuasive in determining
the intent of a party. Simply put, "a provision that would exempt its
drafter from any liability occasioned by [the drafter's] fault should
not compel resort to a magnifying glass and lexicon."2 53 If a clause
is distinct from other general contract language-placed in a sepa-
rately titled section, standing out from surrounding print in a larger
font size, a colored print, capital letters, a boldface print, or a com-
bination of these 254-- a court may be more inclined to infer that the
signing party acknowledged the intent of the clause. The waiver
should be easy to find, preferably on the first page of the docu-
ment, and phrased in clear, non-misleading language without the
use of legal jargon.2 5 Alternatively, the clause could be placed as
the last section prior to the signatures so that it is in plain view of
clause simply disclaiming liability in general terms is insufficient); O'Connell
v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (hold-
ing that in order to be enforceable, the agreement must unambiguously indi-
cate which risks are assumed); Baker v. Stewarts', Inc., 433 N.W.2d 706, 709
(Iowa 1988) (requiring an expression of a clear intent to cover negligence);
Brown v. Racquetball Ctrs., Inc., 534 A.2d 842, 843 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (re-
quiring that the clause spell out the intent of the parties with the greatest of
particularity). But see Cornell v. Council of Unit Owners Hawaiian Village Con-
dominiums, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 640 (D. Md. 1997).
252. See Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 266, 686 A.2d 298, 304
(1996) (stating that "the exculpatory clause need not contain the word 'negli-
gence' or any other 'magic words' ").
253. Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y2d 102, 107 (1979) (citing Rappaport v. Phil Gottlieb-
Sattler, Inc., 114 N.YS.2d 221 (1952)).
254. See Stephanie J. Greer & Hurlie H. Collier, The Conspicuousness Requirement: Lit-
igating and Drafting Contractual Indemnity Provisions in Texas After Dresser Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 243, 265-70 (1994). This arti-
cle reviews the status of liability indemnification and release in Texas after the
Texas Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Dresser Industries v. Page Petro-
leum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993), which cast doubt on the validity of the
clauses. The court ruled that the clauses must meet the UCC standard of con-
spicuousness, even in non-UCC transactions. See Dresser, 853 S.W.2d at 511. The
article sets forth suggestions extracted from various UCC cases discussing the
conspicuousness requirement.
255. See Greer & Collier, supra note 254, at 265.
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the signer. Further, to ensure that the clause was brought to the
reader's attention, the exculpatory provision could be separately
signed or initialed.2 56 The collective effect of these proposals is to
add clarity and conspicuousness to an exculpatory clause, and it
may persuade a court reviewing the clause to acknowledge that a
party knew of the nature and consequences of signing the
document.
V. CONCLUSION
Adloo v. H.T Brown Real Estate, Inc., emphasized what type of
language is necessary to sufficiently create an effective exculpatory
clause. The Adloo court protected homeowners seeking to sell their
homes by requiring that real estate agencies clearly express their in-
tent to avoid liability due to their own negligence.-5 7 Moreover, by
invalidating the contested real estate listing contract clause, 258 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland may have unknowingly destroyed
countless exculpatory clauses that contain language similar to that
of the clause in Adloo, including those outside the real estate
spectrum.
25 9
The Adloo court based its decision on the objective law of con-
tract interpretation and construction. 260 As Adloo emphasized, an ex-
culpatory clause must clearly, unequivocally, specifically, and unmis-
takably express the parties' intent to exculpate a party from liability
resulting from that party's negligence.26' However, the court failed
to give drafters any intelligible guidance as to the requisite language
needed to meet this standard. Rather than adopting a bright-line
standard, 262 the court announced a standard that remains
amorphous.
Injured parties to a contract will use this opinion in an effort
to invalidate exculpatory clauses because of their use of general re-
lease language. 263 Adloo will also require drafters of contracts to be
more meticulous in drafting and redrafting contracts containing ex-
culpatory clauses. The court's reluctance to interfere with the free-
dom to contract is admirable. However, by avoiding the opportunity
256. See id. at 270.
257. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 213-31 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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to adopt a bright-line approach and provide a clear, specific, une-
quivocal, and unmistakable standard, the court may have unwit-
tingly postponed the inevitable. Despite the Adloo court's attempt to
preserve the freedom to contract,264 courts will be forced to con-
tinue to interfere with private contract negotiations in order to an-
swer the questions left unanswered in Adloo.
Kevin G. Hroblak
264. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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